

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REPORT OF THE
STEERING COMMITTEE OF
REORGANIZATION TASK FORCE #2

Sept 11
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[Excerpt from above report, paragraph III, E, (b), page 15.]

(b) Submission of Intelligence Estimates to the Top Command

As part of its recommendation for the reorganization and reorientation of the intelligence effort, the Hoover Commission Report stated that the intelligence unit "should be a device by which the Secretary and Under Secretary can obtain expert evaluations and check on information coming from the action units." The Steering Committee has given a great deal of attention to this problem. It has concluded that R should supply intelligence estimates to the Secretary, Under Secretary and Policy Planning Staff without review by other offices when so requested. In such cases interested offices would be provided with copies of such documents for post-audit. In all other cases, intelligence papers produced in R for the top command should be reviewed by the appropriate regional or Functional Office prior to submission. In the event of disagreement, the reviewing area should be given an opportunity to append its dissent. The Steering Committee believes that this procedure protects the ability of the research and intelligence organization to produce independent estimates. *inf. draft.* At the same time a sound relationship between the research-intelligence organization and other parts of the Department can be maintained.

(c) Dissemination Outside the Department of Intelligence Reports and Estimates

The Steering Committee has, after thorough consideration, concluded that in order that the Department may speak at all times with a consistent voice in its relationships with other agencies, the research and intelligence reports and estimates must be reviewed by the appropriate action office before they are distributed to other agencies. The Committee believes that the review procedure it has recommended gives R the opportunity to express its independent judgement in such reports and estimates, and does not preclude the Department from fulfilling its responsibilities to the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. (There follows a dissent by Mr. Howe to this conclusion.)

Dissent by Mr. Howe

Mr. Howe dissents from the conclusion and recommendation requiring review of all estimates going outside the Department. According to this procedure the research-intelligence organization would find itself in a dilemma wherein, as the Steering Committee indicates, it must join with the rest of the Department in speaking with a consistent voice outside

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the Department and yet, by directive of the National Security Council in establishing coordination for the intelligence agencies, it is obligated to produce estimates based on intelligence factors which therefore might not be consistent with existing policy, including departmental policy. These coordinated national estimates are for the use of the several Departments and for the National Security Council. Mr. Howe believes that R would prefer and expect its contributions generally to reflect the views of and the information available in, the action offices, and it would endeavor, as it has in the past, to achieve this end. Nevertheless, he believes this should not be made mandatory because the other intelligence agencies, finding the Department's intelligence organization estopped from submitting estimates independent of existing policy considerations, would tend to replace the Department's contribution by their own, thus destroying the foundation for coordinated national estimates. Such a situation would not be in the best interests of the Department and further would tend to encourage the development of competitive intelligence production concerned with foreign policy with which the Department would have to deal.

Mr. Howe recommends therefore that R be responsible for obtaining the advice of the appropriate action office before dissemination outside the Department.

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REORGANIZATION TASK FORCE #2

For Armstrong's 9/1/66
Rec'd Sept 6

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